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INJURIES TO BUSINESS UNDER THE VIRGINIA




The law generally treats joint activity more stringently than in-
dividual conduct.1 Quite often judges will state that conduct permissible
if done alone may become wrongful if performed by several actors.' The
tort of civil conspiracy is based on this distinction.' The rationale for this
divergent treatment is simple to state: mere force of numbers often in-
creases the impact of group action thereby expanding the opportunities
for abuse." Thus, conspiracies demand special treatment.
Virginia recognizes the tort of civil conspiracy.' In addition, the
legislature in 1962 enacted a statute8 which expressly forbids two quite
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University.
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' See, e.g., Grenoda Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1910); Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1888).
' See, e.g., Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J. 82, _, 175 A. 62, 68-69 (1934); Kevic-
zky v. Lorber, 290 N.Y. 297, -, 49 N.E.2d 146, 149-40 (1943); In Keviczky and Flink, the
defendants' conduct would not have been actionable if performed by one person. See Note,
Refusal to Deal as a Tort- Conspiracy in a Civil Suit, 45 ILL. L. REv. 784, 788-89 (1951).
3 There has been a good deal of discussion as to whether conspiracy is to be
regarded as a separate tort in itself. On the one hand, it is clear that the mere
agreement to do a wrongful act can never alone amount to a tort, whether or
not it may be a crime; and that some act must be committed by one of the par-
ties in pursuance of the agreement, which is itself a tort. 'The gist of the action
is not the conspiracy charged, but the tort working damage to the plaintiff.'
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 293 (4th ed. 1971) (quoting James v. Evans, 149 F.
136, 140 (3d Cir. 1906)) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
' See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 293; Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77
HARV. L. REv. 888, 929 (1964).
' See, e.g., Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 338, 19 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1942).
6 VA. CODE § 18.2-499 (1975). Subsection (a) provides:
Any two or more persons who shall combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake
or concert together for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring another
in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever, or for the
purpose of willfully and maliciously compelling another to do or perform any act
against his will, or preventing or hindering another from doing or performing any
lawful act, shall be jointly and severally guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. Such
punishment shall be in addition to any civil relief recoverable under §18.2-500.
Subsection (b) creates a criminal and civil cause of action for attempts to violate subsec-
tion (1) and prescribes the same penalties as provided in that subsection.
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different types of joint conduct: A conspiracy (1) to injure another in his
trade, reputation, business or profession, or (2) to compel another to
either perform an unlawful act or to prevent another from doing a lawful
act against his will. These are punished as class three misdemeanors.' In
addition to the criminal penalty, a private party showing an injury to his
business is awarded three fold damages, cost of suit, and a reasonable at-
torney's fee.' Surprisingly, no civil damage remedy is specifically set
forth for a violation of the statute's second part.' An injunction is
authorized for any violation of the statute."°
This statute is an enigma. Its substantive provisions are identical to
an old Wisconsin statute,11 but the Virginia remedies are much harsher. 2
There is no legislative history."3 Given the time of its enactment, the sen-
timent of the legislature," and its similarity to statutes passed in other
states during this period," many attorneys refer to it as the "Anti-Sit-
In" Act." Of course, the statute does not say this directly. In fact the
language is quite open-ended. If it is not just as "Anti-Sit-In" Act, what
kinds of harm did the legislature seek to prevent by condemning con-
spiracies to injure a business? Both federa' 7 and state antitrust laws' 8
' Class three misdemeanors are punishable by a fine of not more than 500 dollars. VA.
CODE § 18.2-11(c) (1975).
VA. CODE § 18.2-500 (1975).
Section 18.2-499 states that civil relief for its violation is contained in § 18.2-500. Sec-
tion 18.2-500 (a) grants treble damages only for injuries to reputation, trade, business or
profession.
" VA. CODE § 18.2-500(b) (1975).
" WIsC. STAT. ANN. § 134.01 (West 1975). The Wisconsin Conspiracy Statute was
enacted in 1887. See 1887 Wisc. LAWS ch. 287.
,1 A triple damages remedy is provided for violations of the Virginia Conspiracy
Statute. VA. CODE § 18.2-500(a). Although the Wisconsin statue does not expressly provide a
civil remedy, Wisconsin courts have long implied a private right of action and a single
damages remedy under it. See, e.g., Randall v. Lonstorf, 126 Wis. 147, -, 105 N.W. 663,
664 (1905).
Contrary to the civil penalties, the criminal penalties provided by the two statutes are
roughly analogous. Compare VA. CODE § 18.2-11(c) (fine not exceeding 500 dollars) with Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 134.01 (West 1975) (fine not exceeding 500 dollars or imprisonment not ex-
ceeding one year).
" The authors attempts to find any legislative history on § 18.2-499 were unsuccessful
and the legislative clerk of the House of Delegates assured us that none existed. The
legislative history of Virginia acts is generally not recorded.
" In 1962, when the Conspiracy Statute was enacted, the Virginia legislature was
following a policy of "massive resistance" to racial integration. See generally J. WILKINSON,
HARRY BIRD AND THE CHANGING FACE OF VIRGINIA POLITICS 1945-1966, (1968).
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 13.6-60 (1972); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-85 (1972).
" Many commentators contend that tort actions currently constitute the gravest
menace to the civil rights movement. See, e.g., Madison, Mississippi's Secondary Boycott
Statutes: Unconstitutional Deprivations of the Right to Engage in Peaceful Picketing and
Boycotting, 18 How. L. J. 583, 607-09 (1975); Sandifer & Smith, The Tort Suit for Damages:
The New Threat to Civil Rights Organizations, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 559, 570-71 (1975).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (§1 of Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (§7 of Clayton Act).
" VA. CODE § 59.1-24 (1973).
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prohibit conspiracies to restrain trade. Common law tort principles also
apply.19 The overlap with these bodies of law seems clear." With its
triple damage remedy, not to mention the criminal sanction,2' this is a
menacing statute.
The writers believe that the time is ripe to consider the Injuries to
Business part of the Conspiracy Statute. Both of us are aware of cases in
which attorneys, encouraged in part by the lure of triple damages,' have
19 Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 934-37, 6 S.E. 620, 624 (1888).
" The second part of the Conspiracy Statute is broader than the first. In Randall v.
Longstorf, 126 Wis. 147, 105 N.W. 663 (1905) the Wisconsin court distinguished the two
parts in the following manner:
The first part of this section evidently was intended to cover conspiracies against
another in his trade or business, but the second part of the act evidently was in-
tended to cover another and broader field, namely, conspiracies maliciously in-
tended to coerce or constrain the action of another by compelling him to do that
which is against his will, or to refrain from doing any lawful act which he desires
to do.
Id. at 464. The Virginia legislature apparently feared that the second part of the statute
might be voided for vagueness. The predecessor of the present Virginia Conspiracy Statute
contained the following provision:
That if any part or parts, section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of
this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is for any
reason declared unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the validity of the
remaining portions of this Act which shall remain in force as if such Act had been
passed with the unconstitutional part or parts, section, subsection, sentence,
clause, phrase, or such application thereof eliminated; and the General Assembly
hereby declares that it would have passed this Act if such unconstitutional part or
parts, section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase had not been included
herein, or if such application had not been made.
VA. CODE § 18.1-74.1:3(b) (1960). When title 18.1 was replaced by title 18.2 in 1975, the
legislature deleted the quoted section.
21 The writers have largely ignored the criminal aspects of the Conspiracy Statute. We
have done so for two reasons. First, few criminal cases are likely to arise under the statute.
There appears to be only one such case in Virginia, and this was based on a plea bargaining
agreement. Furthermore, of all the reported Wisconsin cases under its statute, only one in-
volved a criminal prosecution. See State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046 (1901). In
this regard it should be noted that the Virginia attorney general would not be able to par-
ticipate in criminal proceedings under this section, for he is prevented by the Constitution
of Virginia from participating in or appearing in any criminal trial. Thus any case under the
statute would have to be brought by the local commonwealth attorney, and they seem to
have shown little interest in doing so. (Letter from Katherine A. Schlech, Assistant At-
torney General, to Joseph E. Ulrich (August 13, 1980)). Second, the criminal penalty is
minimal. See note 7 supra.
I The attorneys themselves fare less well under the Conspiracy Statute than under
the antitrust laws. Compare VA. CODE § 18. 2-500(a)(1975) (attorney for successful plaintiff
under Conspiracy Statute entitled to reasonable fee awarded by court) with 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1975) (successful antitrust plaintiff receives reasonable attorney's fee as part of overall
recovery) and VA. CODE § 59.1-9.12(b) (1975) (same). This means that the actual fees received
by a successful plaintiff's lawyer in an antitrust case bear no necessary relationship to the
court awarded amount. The attorney's fee is awarded to the plaintiff but counsel ordinarily
works on a fee negotiated with his client. See generally Alioto, The Economics of a Treble
Damage Case, 32 ANTITRUST L. J. 87 (1966); Kelly, Comment on Attorney's Fees in In-
dividual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1656 (1972).
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sued under this statutory theory." Indeed, it is the triple damage
remedy which sets this section of the statute apart. First, we shall offer
our views as to what kinds of harm fall within the statutory language
"Injuries to Business". Second, we shall set forth a construction of this
language which both carries out the apparent purposes of the statute as
well as reconciles it with overlapping areas of antitrust and torts. Final-
ly, we shall state reasons why the mandatory triple damages provision
should be repealed.
II. Scope of the Statute
What kinds of harms will be classified as injuries to "reputation,
trade, business, or profession"? We will consider the issue in the context
of employment relationships, discussing especially the situation of the
employee at will. A brief review of the employee-employer relationship
is necessary.24 An employee working pursuant to a written contract of
employment (not terminable at will) may, of course, sue his employer for
breach of the contract." The basis of the action is contractual, and the
issue of malice plays no part in the case.26 Damages are limited to lost in-
come pursuant to the contract and consequential damages.' Where the
employee works under a contract terminable at will, he has no cause of
action for discharge.' Clearly, the employee at will is largely un-
protected from discharge. In response to this void, courts recently have
fashioned a remedy for the employee at will who has been terminated for
a reason which offends the particular court's sensibility. This class of
remedy has been described as the doctrine of retaliatory discharge.'
I The writers are themselves counsel in cases under the statute, one of us for plaintiff
and the other for defendant.
"' The present discussion is limited to situations not caused by collective bargaining
agreements or legislative limitations on discharge.
I See, e.g., American Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Melton, 211 Va. 562, 563, 179
S.E.2d 465, 465 (1971).
Crescent Horse-Shoe Iron Co. v. Eynon, 95 Va. 151, 159, 27 S.E. 935, 937 (1897).
Standard Laundry Service v. Pastelnick, 166 Va. 125, 129, 184 S.E. 193, 195 (1936).
Punitive damages may be recovered where the defendant's acts amount to an independent
intentional tort. Wright v. Everett, 197 Va. 608, 615, 90 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1956). See also Wor-
rie v. Boze, 198 Va. 533, 543-44, 95 S.E.2d 192, 201 (1957).
' Plaskitt v. Black Diamond Trailer Company, Inc., 209 Va. 460, 467, 164 S.E.2d 645,
650 (1968).
1 The retalitory discharge doctrine, being in its initial stages of development, consists
of a number of theories. In Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978), the
court found a cause of action in favor of an at-will employee who was terminated after he ad-
vised governmental authorities of his employer's violations of federal lending laws. In
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), the court found a cause of ac-
tion in favor of an at-will employee who was terminated after she refused sexual relations
with her job foreman. The court stated that "a bad faith termination is not in the best in-
terest of the economic system or the public good." 114 N.H. at 132; 316 A.2d at 551. Thus, in
Harless, the employer was violating the public policy expression of a statute. In Monge, the
policy was established by the courts.
[Vol. XXXVIII
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This doctrine has been stated as the rule that "a termination by the
employer of a contract of employement at will which is motivated by bad
faith or malice or based on a retaliation is not in the best interest of the
economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the
employment contract."3
The doctrine is not universally accepted. Many decisions follow the
common law rule that an employee at will may be discharged for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all." While there are no reported
Virginia court decisions on this point, a recent federal court opinion, ap-
plying Virginia law, held that no such action is available in Virginia, 32
thus leaving the employee at will unprotected from retalitory discharge.
Virginia does recognize the tort of intentional interference with con-
tract,' but presumably an employee at will would be precluded from us-
ing this theory by the rule of Plaskitt v. Black Diamond Trailer Co. ." In
Plaskitt, the plaintiff acted as defendant's exclusive sales agent for the
sale of trailers. For a period of two years, plaintiff was paid on a commis-
sion basis. When the defendant notified the plaintiff that it intended to
takeover the business with itsown sales force, the plaintiff sued to pre-
vent termination. The court held that a contract for the rendition of ser-
vice, which does not provide for the time which it is to continue, is ter-
minable at will if reasonable notice is given."5 The court found that the
absence of "additional consideration [in addition to] such things as would
normally be done . . . in the performance of personal services. .. "
precluded a right of recovery to an employee at will. Although the ex-
tent of the "additional consideration" required was not specified by the
court, the expenses of plaintiffs in writing, telephoning or making per-
sonal calls in connection with selling merchandise did not qualify as suffi-
cient additional consideration.
7
The employee may also sue under the common law in an action for
damages caused by a conspiracy. Where one alleges that he suffered
damage as a result of one or more overt acts pursuant to a conspiracy, he
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 132, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (citation
omitted).
s' See, e.g., Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1977).
Blevins v. General Electric Company, - F. Supp. - , (W.D. Va. 1980).
Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va. 533, 540, 95 S.E.2d 192, 196 (1957).
209 Va. 460, 164 S.E.2d 645 (1968).
209 Va. at 467; 164 S.E.2d at 650 (citing Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906)). In his concurring opinion, Judge Gordon
stated that he would have repudiated Stonega. 209 Va. at 470; 164 S.E.2d at 652.
209 Va. at 464; 164 S.E.2d at 648.
Id Despite plaintiff's assertion that his efforts had been responsible for building up
defendant's sales of trailers as "piggyback" carriers for railroads into a profitable business,
the court treated the plaintiff as a mere salesman providing personal services. If the plain-
tiff had invested in facilities or even purchased the trailers on consignment, a different case
might have been presented. Id
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has set out a cause of action. 8 At common law, a conspiracy was a crime
without an overt act, while a civil conspiracy was not actionable without
an overt act. 9 By contrast, one effect of the Conspiracy Statute is to
remove the requirement that plaintiff plead an overt act pursuant to the
conspiracy to state a cause of action." An allegation of a conspiracy caus-
ing unjustified damages states a cause of action under the statute.1
Although a plaintiff showing an injury to his business due to a con-
spiracy would be entitled to recover actual damages plus punitives in
the proper case, 2 under the Plaskitt decision it appears that an
employee at-will is not engaged in business. 3
Does the Conspiracy Statute give a right of action to the otherwise
unprotected employee at will? The statute applies to any "person" in-
jured in his "reputation, trade, business or profession." The language of
the statute seems to indicate clearly that an employee at will may use it.
However, none of the reported cases decided under the Wisconsin
statute44 involved a plaintiff-employee at will. In a case seemingly well
suited for the application of the statute, it was not even mentioned. In
Mendelson v. Blatz Brewing Co., an officer/stockholder in Blatz Brew-
ing Co. sued his employer and its officers claiming a conspiracy to injure
Mendelson in his employment. He claimed that he was discharged from
his employment, which was terminable at will, and was forced to sell his
stock in the company so that another officer/shareholder's inexperienced
son could fill Mendelson's position. The trial court sustained the defen-
dant's demurrer, but this action was reversed on appeal, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court holding that it does recognize a cause of action for
wrongfully procuring the breach of an employment contract terminable
at will.46
This seems a classic case for the application of the Conspiracy
Statute. Why did plaintiffs counsel not assert it?47 In a similar case, the
Wisconsin court mentioned the statute almost as an after thought. 8 Did
the court find it not applicable in Mendelson?49 Perhaps plaintiff s
counsel wanted to avoid the issue, probably to be raised by the defense,
Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 338, 19 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1942).
Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 76 (1905); see note 3 supra.
40 Radue v. Dill, 74 Wis.2d 239, 241, 246 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (1977).
41 See note 175 infra.
'" Anchor Co. v. Adams, 139 Va. 388, 393, 124 S.E. 438, 439 (1924); see also Worrie v.
Boze, 198 Va. 533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1957).
1 See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
4 WISC. STAT. ANN. § 134.01 (West 1975).
45 9 Wis.2d 487, 101 N.W.2d 805 (1960).
9 Wis.2d at _ ; 101 N.W.2d at 807.
" See also Lorenz v. Dreske, 162 Wis.2d 273, 214 N.W.2d 753 (1974)' (fired contract
employee did not assert Conspiracy Statute claim).
'3. See, e.g., White v. White, 132 Wis. 121, -, 111 N.W.2d 1116, 1119, (1907).
41 See note 45 supra.
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thatthe defendant's actions were solely for the best interest of the cor-,
poration, thereby precluding a finding of malice, or even conspiracy."
With this background, a review of the limited Virginia case law
interpreting the statute may be helpful. There are no reported Virginia
court decisions construing Conspiracy Statute, but three federal court
opinions construing it have been reported." Two of those opinions arose
in the context of a defendant's motion to dismiss based on a plea of the
statute of limitations." Virginia Code section 8-24, controlling at the
time of both opinions, provided a two-year statute of limitations for
injuries to the person, a five-year limitation for damage to property, and
a one-year limitation for all other actions.' In Federated Graphics v.
Napotnik," plaintiff-corporation sued individual defendants, officers of
the corporate defendant, claiming they wrongfully caused their corpora-
tion to file an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against the plaintiff
destroying its business. The defendants moved to dismiss the action,
solely on the basis of the statute of limitations. 5' They asserted that the
plaintiff's claim was really in the nature of malicious prosecution to
which the one-year statute applied. The court responded by stating that
malicious prosecution involved injury to the person, while the Conspiracy
Statute was directed at injuries to property" such as those alleged by the
plaintiff.
A later case amplifies this distinction between injuries to to a person
and injuries to property. In Moore v. Allied Chemical Corp.,'7 William
Moore, a principal in Life Science Products (LSP), producer of Kepone,
sued Allied and others claiming a variety of causes of action relating to
the many problems arising out of the manufacture of Kepone. Count II
alleged that certain defendants conspired to injure Moore in his reputa-
tion, trade, business or profession in violation of the Conspiracy Statute,
presenting to the court the question of the relation of the statute to an
individual plaintiff who was also a principal in a business. The court held
that the statute, by referring to "reputation, trade, business or profes-
sion," not only protects corporations but also individuals who own and
operate their own business." After reviewing the evidence, the court in
' Possibly counsel worried that the words in the statute referred only to business or
property rights rather than personal rights. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
51 Moore v. Allied Chemical Corp., 480 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Va. 1979); Federated
Graphics Co. v. Napotnik, 424 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1976); Fowler v. Department of Ed., 472
F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1970).
"Moore v. Allied Chemical Corp., 480 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Va. 1979); Federated
Graphics Co. v. Napotnik, 424 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Va. 1976).
5VA. CODE § 8-24 (1976 Supp.).
424 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Va. 1976).
Ld at 292.
Id. at 293.
480 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Va. 1979). Arguably, Moore had a cause of action under VA.
CODE § 18.2-499(a). ("preventing or binding another from doing or performing a lawful act.")
'4480 F. Supp. at 374.
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Moore held that since plaintiff did not claim damage to his investment or
monetary losses in Life Science Products, he was asserting a common
law libel and slander action which was not actionable under the Con-
spiracy Statute. The court quoted the following language in Federated
Graphics to support the proposition that the statute protected business,
not individuals:
This statutory action provides a remedy for wrongful conduct
directed to the business. An injury to one's business is clearly an
injury to one's property interest (citations omitted). * * * Ma-
licious prosecution involves wrongful conduct directed at a per-
son which may indirectly damage property. The statutory action,
on the other hand, focuses upon conduct directed at property,
ie., one's business. Accordingly, the nature of the two actions
differ.59
Applying this analysis to plaintiff Moore, the court had no difficulty in
holding that where the individual could show no damage to his property
interests in the business, he could not recover under Conspiracy Statute.
Since plaintiff does not claim that the alleged conspiracy caused
damage to his investment and monetary losses in connection
with LSP, he obviously is advancing a common-law claim for libel
and slander to his personal reputation. This type of claim is not
actionable under Section 18.2-499.
In Federated Graphics, supra, Judge Merhige rejected the no-
tion that the statute codifies common-law actions. Rather,
statutory coverage is afforded only when malicious conduct is
directed at one's business, not one's person. Id. at 294. On the
basis of the deposition of Moore, the Court finds that Count II
does not state a claim actionable under Va. Code Ann. §
18.2-499.1o
Lest there be any doubt, the Moore court in a footnote clearly rejected
the notion that an individual plaintiff could recover under the Conspiracy
Statute for damage to his "reputation, trade, business or profession"
without proving damage to his business investment.
Plaintiff, of course, might argue that damage to his reputation
would result in damage to his "business" or "profession" as a
chemist. Under Section 8-24, however, such damage would be
only to future earnings and profits-an indirect or consequential
injury. More important, since injury and personal reputation or-
dinarily causes damage to one's business or profession, nearly
5' 424 F. Supp. at 293.
480 F. Supp. at 374-75.
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every defamation action would fall within the coverage of Sec-
tion 18.2-499. Federated Graphics obviously rejected this
theory."
We submit that the analysis on which both Moore and Federated
Graphics are grounded is somewhat suspect. The federal courts held
that the phrase "reputation, trade, business, or profession" should be
equated to business property interests as distinguished from interests of
personalty. Apparently, the statute only applies if the plaintiff can show
an injury to an investment interest in his business. The difficulty with
this is that the distinction was developed in the context of the statute of
limitations. We wonder whether this setting permitted the court to con-
sider the full range of policy issues involved. It also seems significant
that the Virginia Supreme Court has given the terms "trade",
"business", and "profession" much broader meanings when interpreting
them in other contexts.2 Arguably, the words trade or profession refer
more to individual activity than to interests in business. Yet, this may be
a case in which the court felt constrained to read the statute narrowly
due to the severity of the remedy-triple damages."
We conclude, however, that if the rationale of these two federal deci-
sions is carried to its logical conclusion, the unjustified destruction of the
employment relationship by joint action would not give rise to a cause of
action in favor of an employee under the Injuries to Business provision
of the Conspiracy Statute. The employment relation would be
characterized as a personal right as opposed to a business interest. On
the other hand, the employer should be able to use the statute in certain
cases, the superstar professional athlete being a clear illustration. Final-
ly, it appears certain that the federal interpretation precludes a holding
that the Conspiracy Statute protects employees at-will against
retaliatory discharges."
l Id- at 375 n. 3. If the plaintiff in Mendelson, see text accompanying notes 45 & 46
supra, had sued for the reduction in price of his stock due to the forced sale, he probably
would have had a cause of action under Moore's construction of the statute since an injury
to his investment would be alleged.
" See Board of Supervisors v. Boaz, 176 Va. 126, 130, 10 S.E.2d 498,499 (1940) (constru-
ing "trade, occupation, and business" as nontechnical terms used in their ordinary sense).
" See text accompanying note 178 supra.
" A federal case decided prior to Moore indicates that the courts might have intended
to protect employees at-will. In Fowler v. Department of Education, 472 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.
Va. 1978), the court dismissed the plaintiffs claim against various individual defendants, of-
ficials of defendant Department of Education, on the ground that their actions were done in
the scope of their employment and therefore the defendants could not be found to have con-
spired. Id at 122. The plaintiff was apparently an employee of the Department of Education,
but the court did not dismiss the case on the basis that the statute did not protect individual
plaintffs, thus leaving open the possibility that the statute covers an employee, without a
showing of damage to "investment."
Whether a retalitory discharge case would give rise to a cause of action under the se-
cond part of the Conspiracy Statue, see note 20 supra, will be considered in a subsequent ar-
ticle.
1981]
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III. Construction of the Statute
Assuming the phrase "Injuries to Business" is limited as just in-
dicated, there are many different types of business behavior encompassed
by the statutory language.6 5 The most significant of these is the
boycott,66 and for this reason we will focus our discussion on this prac-
tice. As used here, a boycott involves an agreement among individuals to
follow a uniform course of action, most often termination of business
relations with a designated firm, in an effort to achieve some goal or pur-
pose. 7 In addition, the distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial boycotts should be indicated. 8 In this regard the goal of the parties
is crucial. A commercial boycott describes one form of joint efforts of
business firms to increase profits. 9 Such business-motivated activities
traditionally are regulated by the Sherman Act.7 A noncommercial
boycott involves joint efforts by nontraders whose goals may be either
I See, e.g., Judevine v. Benzies-Montange Fuel and Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269
N.W. 295 (1936) (conspiracy to damage business credit).
I Wisconsin judges have on occasion referred to its statute as an antiboycott statute.
Trade Press Pub. Co. v. Moore, 180 Wis. 449, 193 N.W. 507, 512 (1923); Hawarden v.
Youghiogheny and L. Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472, 474 (1901).
The word boycott is an eponymic term which has as its origin the trials and tribulations
of Captain Charles C. Boycott. Boycott, a retired British army officer serving as an estate
manager in Ireland, refused to reduce rent in response to demands by the Irish Land
League and served eviction on his tenant. At the urging of Charles Parnell, an Irish national
leader, Boycott's tenants refused further dealing with him. Subsequently, the Captain was
obligated to import workers from Oster to harvest his crop under the guard of hundreds of
soldiers. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANICA 212 (15th ed. 1974).
The boycott is a method of employing economic sanctions. Boycotts are normally
divided into two categories. A primary boycott is usually defined to include situations in
which a group attempts to induce favorable behavior by a trader at a different level of
distribution by ceasing its own dealing with the trader, thus cutting off a vital economic
relationship. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(whiskey manufacturers jointly refused to sell to retailers not following their price ceiling).
The secondary boycott, however, is the more common. It requires the cooperation of a party
at a different level in the distribution process from that on which the instigators operate.
Where members of an industry desire to punish or eliminate a competitor, they can do so
only by inducing the competitor's suppliers or customers to stop dealing with him. This is
ordinarily done by threatening to stop dealing with the competitor's customers or suppliers.
See, e.g., FTC v. Fashion Originators Guild, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1,
142 A. 607 (1899). See generally Note, Use of Economic Sanctions by Private Groups:
Illegality Under the Sherman Act 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 171, 176-181 (1962).
1 The distinction between commercial and noncommercial boycotts was first ar-
ticulated by Professor Coons in 1962. See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman
Act Defense, 56 Nw. L. REV. 705, 709-13 (1962 [hereinafter cited as Coons]. Since that time,
courts and commentators have followed Coons' terminology. See, e.g., Missouri v. National
Organization for Women, 467 F. Supp. 289, 301 (E.D. Mo. 1978), affd, 620 F.2d 1301, 1315
n.16 (8th Cir. 1980); Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals
to Deal 1970 DUKE L. J. 247, 292 [hereinafter cited as Bird]; Note, Protest Boycotts Under
the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1140 (1980).
69 See Coons, supra note 68, at 709-13.
71 Id. at 727.
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political, social, or religious rather than business.71 The traditional view
is that such noncommercial activitiy is beyond the scope of the Sherman
Act and is governed instead by constitutional and tort principles.72
Before offering an interpretation of the injuries to business provi-
sions of the Conspiracy Statute, it is necessary to look at its common law
antecedents, the antitrust statutes regulating similar types of con-
spiracies, and the case law under the identical Wisconsin statute. In this
way we should be better able to define the statute's ambit and place it
into the scheme of remedies granted to Virginia plaintiffs for business
injuries.
A. Common law antecedents."3
The common law long recognized the right of everyone to engage in
trade free from unjustified interference with his business relationships. 4
In fact, this was often described as a property right. 5 This property
right was substantially tempered, however, by the privilege of competi-
tion."0 What does competition mean in this context? As Milton Friedman
has pointed out:
"1 I& at 709-13. It is possible, but unlikely, that businessmen could engage in a noncom-
mercial boycott. To fall within such classification, businessmen could have no commercial in-
terest in the boycott's success. But cf. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §
92, at 262-5 (1977) (suggesting hypothetical case of competitor instigating consumer boycott).
See also Katex v. Lefkowitz, 216 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1961) (conspiracy by apartment owners not
to rent to blacks.).
" Missouri v. National Organization for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1315 (8th Cir. 1980);
Bird, supra note 68, at 292; Coons, supra note 68, at 742.
,7 Justice Holmes had much to do with the development of the law in the area covered
by this section. Of particular importance is his influential article, Privilege, Malice and In-
tent 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 762-67 (1939).
" See generally PROSSER, supra note 3, §§ 128-130; Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL.
L. REV. 1 (1930).
" See, e.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926); Stein v. Schmitz, 21 N. J. Misc.
218, -, 32 A.2d 844, 848 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
" The right to engage in competition, implicit in the right to engage in trade, has
received much common law and statutory attention. Recognition of the law of entry in com-
petition, even though it brings injury to the established trader's patronage, prices, and pro-
fits, came early in English law and represented to move out of fuedalism. In the
"Schoolmaster's Case," Y. B. Pasch. 17 Hen. 4, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410), reprinted in 7 AMES FOUN-
DATION 20 (1926), the headmaster of a grammar school in Gloucester brought a trespass ac-
tion against another who established a competing. school on the ground that the latter entry
had brought the price per child down from 40 d. to 12 d. The court held that there was no
cause of action. Two hundred years later, in "The Case of Monolopies," Darcy v. Alleyn, 77
Eng. Rep. 1260 (1602), the court held void a grant by Queen Elizabeth of a monolopy of play-
ing cards to a trader and stated the historic objections:
[Any monolopy] is not only a damage and prejudice to those who exercise the
same trade, but also to all other subjects for the end of all these monolopies is for
the private gain of the patentees . .. [T]here are three inseparable incidents to
every monolopy ... 1. that the price of the commodity will be raised.... 2. after
the monolopy grant, the commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was
1981]
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[C]ompetition has two very different meanings. In ordinary
discourse, competition means personal rivalry, with one in-
dividual seeking to outdo his known competitor. In the economic
world, competition means almost the opposite. There is no per-
sonal rivalry in the competitive marketplace. There is no per-
sonal higgling. The wheat farmer in a free market does not feel
himself in personal rivalry with, or threatened by, his neighbor,
who is, in fact, his competitor. The essence of a competitive
market is its impersonal character.7
The common law adopted the nontechnical definition of competition.
Given the setting of the cases in which the question arose, this was only
natural. The plaintiff would claim that the defendant had harmed his
business by some activity, thereby envading his property right to
engage in trade. The defendant would originally respond by admitting
the conduct and the intended harm to the plaintiff, but assert that so
long as he took the custom from his rival by legitimate means-that is,
by methods other than intimidation, coercion or other tortious activity,
78
he was privileged even though he knew, and intended, harm to his com-
petitor. The courts agreed 79 with the defendant, holding that the law ap-
before.... 3. [iut tends to the improvishment of divers, artificers and others, who
before by [their labor] had maintained themselves and their families, who now will
of necessity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary ....
Id. at 1263. In 1623 Parliament passed "The Statute of Monolopies", 1623, 21 James 1, c. 3,
invalidating crown grants of monolopy, providing an action for triple damages for persons
injured by such a monolopy, and accepting limited grants for new inventions. See generally
Jones, Historical Develoment of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE L. J. 905 (1926);
36 YALE L. J. 42, 207, 351 (1927).
77 M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 119 (1962). Professor Bork has identified
five district meanings for "competition" as used in antitrust cases. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 58-61 (1977).
78 Coercive conduct may take many different forms. See, e.g., Evenson v. Spaulding,
150 F. 517 (9th Cir. 1907) (physical interference as well as intimidation of plaintiffs
customers); Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle, 118 Ky. 662, 82 S.W. 271 (1904) (harrassment of plain-
tiffs delivery wagon drivers); Gilly v. Hirsh, 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422 (1909) (placing signs to
create impression that entrance of one store was entrance of another). See generally
Annot., 9 ALR 2d 228 (1950).
7' The classic American case sanctioning harm to a plaintiff by any competitive means
is Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App.2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935). In Katz, the plaintiff claimed that the
defendants injured his business by, inter alia, selling below cost and threatening to drive
out of business anyone who dealt with the plaintiff. In sustaining the defendant's demurrer,
the court said:
The defendants are -not charged with making any effort to deprive plaintiff of his
trade except by transferring the same to themselves. This is essentialy business
competition. The defendant did or threatened to do nothing other than to gain a
business advantage proportionate to the losses sustained a plaintiff, and by the ac-
complishment of that end their purposes would have been satisfied....
[The defendant's acts] were not unlawful nor were they committed in an
unlawful matter. They related solely to the aims of the defendants to engage in
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proved of inflicting harm as a consequence of competition because the
public benefited in the long run from lower prices and better products.'
Thus, the focus of the case was upon the goals of the rivals and the
methods employed to compete. 1
The common law rules governing cases in which a single party in-
flicted harm on another's business ordinarily were stated in terms of the
"malice formula."82 Where the defendant acted for the sole purpose of
destroying another's business, such activity was "malicious," per-
sumably on the ground that once the defendant accomplished his objec-
tive, his own business would close and therefore the public would lose
both sources of supply.' There would be no public benefits to offset the
harm inflicted. On the other hand, if the defendant possessed dual
motives, to destroy plaintiff's business (malicious) and to compete for
custom (legitimate), defendant's activities were protected. 4 Since
business competition with plaintiff for the resulting business advantage to
themselves. The fact that the methods used were ruthless, or unfair, in a moral
sense, does not stamp them as illegal. It has never been regarded as the duty or
province of the courts to regulate practices in the business world beyond the point
of applying legal or equitable remedies in cases involving acts of oppression or
deceit which are unlawful.
7 Cal App. 2d at _; 44 P.2d at 1062. The competitor-defendant's attitude toward his vic-
tim has been succinctly described as "disinterested malice." American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350,358 (1921) (Holmes); Nann v. Raimrst, 255 N.Y.
307, 319 (1931) (Cardozo).
For instance, a man has a right to set up a shop in small village which can sup-
port but one of the kind, although he expects and intends to ruin a deserving
widow who is established there already. [This privilege] rests on the economic
principle that free competition is worth more to society than it costs.
Holmes, supra note 32, at 3. The English position, to which Holmes owed much, is summariz-
ed in J. FLEMING, LAW OF TORTS 214-18 (1967).
1 Rivalry of the parties is the focus of the comprehensive tort doctrines governing
competitor cases. See Callmann, Boycott and Price War:. Violation of the Antitrust Laws or
Unfair Competition, 23 OHIO ST. L. REV. 128, 134 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Callmann]
(prima facie tort doctrine); Note, Unfair Competition Under the Sherman Act. C. Albert
Sauter Co. v. Richard S. Sauter Co. and the Pick-Barth Rule, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1194, 1217-20
(1974) (relationship between common tort activity and Sherman Act § 1 activity).
'" Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 924-32 (1964).
But when a man starts an opposition place of business, not for the sake of profit
to himself, but regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole purpose of driving
his competitor out of business, and with the intention of himself retiring upon
the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of a wanton wrong
and an actionable tort. In such a case he would not be exercising his legal right,
or doing an act which can be judged separately from the motive which actuated
him. To call such conduct competition is a perversion of terms. It is simply the
application of force without legal justification, which in its moral quality may be
no better than highway robbery.
Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, -, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (1909).
For examples of the use of the malice formula to protect defendants who intentional-
ly inflicted harm on plaintiff, see L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS, A.
SMITH & J. TREECE, ADVANCED TORTS § 22-23 (1977).
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business rivals generally entertain such mixed motives towards each
other, seldom will unilateral activity be characterized as malicious. Such
an approach prevents the undue burdening of commercial activity which
might occur if each businessman had to answer for his motives. 5
As noted earlier, group activity ordinarily has been viewed with
greater suspicion than unilateral conduct due to the increased potential
of a combination to cause harm.88 In Boutwell v. Marr," this distinction
was decisive. In that case, the defendants, wholesalers, agreed to
boycott any manufacturer who sold directly to retailers thereby
eliminating these middlemen. The defendants asserted that the boycott
was to protect the group's economic interests and therefore was
privileged competition. In an opinion with a modern ring the Vermont
court responded:
It is true, as suggested in argument, that everyone engaged in
business is liable to have it injured or destroyed by the action of
those upon whom he depends for patronage. But, when those
upon whom he depends for patronage are acting as individuals,
he has a measure of security in the probability that different
preferences will be shown by persons left to their own choice;
and, if some who desire to injure his business secure the coopera-
tion of others by unlawful means, the law gives him a remedy. If
the defendants are right, he can be deprived of this security and
this remedy by converting those who desire his injury into the
majority of an association, and those who do not into a suppressed
minority, held to the designated course by the pressure of a
system of fines and penalties. But giving a new face to an old
8 The "malice formula," see text accompanying notes 41-43 supra, often has been used
to illustrate the existence and operation of the "prima facie tort doctrine," see, e.g.,
Callman, supra note 81, at 134. Under the prima facie tort doctrine, a boycott is prima facie
unlawful and the defendant is liable unless he can justify his act. Id.
The doctrine was originally formulated in England in the 1880s. See Mogul S.S. Co. v.
McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B. 598, 613 (1889), afffd, [1892] A.C. 25 (1891); W. POLLOCK,
TORTS 21 (1st ed. 1887). The first American formulation of the prima facie tort doctrince oc-
curred in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904). In Aikens, the Court held that the
Wisconsin injuries to business statute, the forerunner to Virginia's Conspiracy Statute, did
not violate the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 206. In his opinion, Justice Holmes stated: "It
has been considered that, prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a
cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of
pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape liability." Id. at 204. While the
prima facie tort doctrine's significance may have been to broaden tort doctrines since the
turn of the century, see Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facia Tort
Principle, 54 Nw. L. REv. 563, 573-74 (1959); Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restate-
ment, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 7, 12 (1957), it adds little to traditional tort concepts in enabling
the courts to choose and weigh the factors relevant to each particular case. See Green,
Trade Relations Under Tort Law, 47 VA. L. REV. 559, 569-73 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Green].
See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
71 Vt. 1, 142 A. 607 (1899).
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wrong can never defeat the remedy, for the law will inquire as to
the substance of the thing complained of. If the plaintiffs were in
fact injured by a forced withdrawal of patronage secured
through the action of the defendants' organization, they are en-
titled to redress."
In sum, what makes this group behavior unlawful, said the court, is its
superior effectiveness in the market. Where a single firm acts alone, its
suppliers or customers receive protection from the actor's rivals;89 but, if
a group which controls the market refuses to deal, the victim has no
alternative sources of supply or demand. Group activity may prevent the
normal checks of the competitive market from operating.
The Boutwell decision, however, represented the common law
minority view. Prosser notes that "[Ilt undoubtedly is true that in the
absence of statute, combinations to refuse to deal are not in themselves
and without more unlawful, particularly where their purpose is merely
to protect their members against evils which threaten their own busi-
ness."9 Boycotts, said the majority of courts, are merely one form of
lawful competition. 1 At worst, the combination possesses mixed motives.
If the combination won out, this demonstrates the superiority of this
71 Vt. at .; 142 A. at 609.
Except in situations involving public utilities or monopolies, an unilateral refusal to
deal was always lawful, even if motivated by actual malice. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§
762-65 (1939). In addition to the fact that victims receive protection from an actor's com-
petitors, it was asserted that competitive traders ought to have the absolute right to choose
their customers. See generally Brown, The Right to Refuse to Sel4 25 YALE L. J. 194 (1916).
The rule that a business ought to have the unfettered right to refuse to deal has been
criticized. See e.g., Calman, supra note 81, at 134; Note, Refusal to Deal as a Tort-
Conspiracy in a Civil Suit, 45 ILL. L. REV. 784 (1951).
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 130, at 961.
91 The leading case articulating the majority rule is Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow
& Co., [1892] A.C. 25, in which the defendants' boycott activities (rebates to shippers and
predatory pricing) drove the plaintiff out of the market. The defendants' conduct was
upheld by Lord Bowen on the following rationale:
What, then, are the limitations which the law imposes on a trader in the con-
duct of his business as between himself and other traders? ... No man, whether
trader or not, can ... justify damaging another in his commercial business by
fraud or misrepresentation. Intimidation, obstruction, and molestation are forbid-
den; so is the intentional procurement of a violation of individual rights, contracts
or other, assuming always that there is no just cause for it .... But the defen-
dants have been guilty of none of these acts. They have done nothing more
against the plaintiff than pursue to the bitter end a war of competition weighed in
the interest of their own trade. To the argument that a competition so pursued
ceases to have a just cause or excuse when there is ill-will or a personal intention
to harm, it is sufficient to reply (as I have already pointed out) that there was here
no persopal intention to do any other or greater harm to the plaintiff than such as
was necessarily involved in the desire to attract to the defendants' ships the en-
tire tea freights of the ports, a portion of which would otherwise have fallen to the
plaintiff's share.... To say that a man is to trade freely, but that he is to stop
short at any act which is calculated to harm other tradesman, and which is design-
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business form. The marketplace, not the courts, is the proper forum for
rivalry involving business self-interest."
The attraction of this concept of competition as rivalry becomes evi-
dent from a brief consideration of the labor combination cases decided
under the common law.9" The courts failed to distinguish business com-
binations from employee combinations. 4 Both were illegal unless
privileged, and the applicable privilege was competition. In both set-
tings, competition was viewed as rivalry with others for the same pro-
duct within the same market: businesses competed for the custom of
buyers, while employees competed for jobs of the same employer98 or in-
creased share of the revenues earned by the employer's business.9" In
both instances combination was a method employed in pursuit of self-in-
terest. Where the union's efforts were focused upon someone other than
the employer, its "rival," the analogy to normal marketplace competition
broke down, and the union's efforts were characterized as "malicious"
even though the conflict between employers and employees was
evident.9" Since no other privilege applies, liability was imposed on the
ed to attract business to his own shop, would be a strange and impossible counsel
of perfection.
Id at 614-15.
Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, - , 55 N.W. 1119, 1121 (1893). In Hollis,
retail lumber dealers agreed to boycott any manufacturer or wholesale dealer that sold
lumber directly to consumers. Since no fraud or intimidation was employed, the court
reasoned that the threatened boycott simply presented the plaintiff-wholesalers with a
business decision. Responding to the argument that the defendant association possessed too
much power, the court stated that "[a]ssociations may be entered into, the object of which is
to adopt measures that may tend to diminish the gains and profits of another, and yet, so far
from being unlawful, they may be highly meritorious." Id; see also Mongul S.S. Co. v.
McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25 ("if peaceable and honest combinations of capital for
purpose of trade competition are to be struck at, it must, I think, be by legislation, for I do
not see that they are under the bar of the common law.") Cf. Holmes, supra note 73, at 6-9
(legality of business combinations should be decided as policy matter by legislatures).
"s See generally C. GREGORY & H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 13-199 (3d ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as GREGORY & KATZ]. The following discussion is a simplified treatment of
a very complicated area.
" See, e.g., Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, - , 50 S.E.
353, 353 (1905); Webber v. Barry, 66 Mich. 127, -, 33 N.W. 289, 291 (1887) Crump v. Com-
monwealth, 84 Va. 927, 934-37, 6 S.E. 620, 624 (1888); Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1.
11 See generally 2 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 232 (4th ed. 1932).
96Id
Id If the employee strike or boycott harmed the employer's business, this was view-
ed as illegitimate competition. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Gautner, 167 Mass. 92, -, 44 N.E.
1077, 1078 (1896).
" In Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1, a boilermakers union pressured a shipyard to fire
two shipwrights who refused to join the union. The House of Lords upheld the union's ac-
tion on the ground that the shipwrights and the union were in competition for jobs. Id at 24.
By so holding, the court extended to labor unions the same competition defense it had
previously sanctioned for business combinations. See Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow &
Co., [1892] A. C. 25; note 49 supra. Subsequently, however, the court restricted the types of
activities that unions could conduct. In Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495, an employer was
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union."
Up to this point, the discussion has dealt with cases concerning
business rivals who attempted to justify their conduct on the basis of
competition. Suppose, however, nontraders attempted to justify the in-
tentional infliction of economic harm on plaintiffs business for noncom-
mercial reasons. Two cases involving college presidents illustrate the
general approach. In Gott v. Berea College,00 the defendant president
directed his students not to patronize plaintiffs restaurant. The
justification asserted was that the boycott was a necessary adjunct to
the school's role of supervising the morals and education of its charges.
While the court found these restrictions reasonable, it also held that
their reasonableness was irrelevant. The mere existence of such
justifications sufficed. On the other hand, when a college president
organized a similar boycott merely to satisfy a personal grudge, as the
defendant did in Hutton v. Walters,"°' the plaintiffs claim succeeded.
Since this defendant's conduct did not promote a bona fide societal in-
terest, it was characterized as malicious. '
The issue in these cases is more complicated than the competitor
cases, for in the latter the existence of trade rivalry justifies the defen-
dant's action no matter how powerful his other motives or how ruthless
his tactics.' In the nontrader cases, the courts must decide whether the
goals promoted by the defendant's conduct outweigh the plaintiffs prop-
erty right to operate his business free from such interference. 4 This
balancing process is extremely difficult since the interests are incom-
mensurable. For this reason, an opinion like Gott seems arbitrary. Yet,
what these opinions do demonstrate is that the common law has long
permitted infliction of harm on a business by nontraders for reasons
other than competition.
1 5
subjected to secondary boycott pressures by the union when he refused to replace his
workers with union members. The House of Lords held that as a result of the secondary
boycott, the combination did not have a justifiable objective and, consequently, the union
was guilty of civil conspiracy. Id. at 525. Modern commentators have harshly criticized
Quinn, charging that the case created a "double standard" for labor since the court had ap-
proved in Mogul secondary boycott tactics by business combinations. See, e.g., GREGORY &
KATZ, supra note 93, at 98; R. WYKSTRA & E. STEVENS, AMERICAN LABOR & MANPOWER
POLICY 27-28 (1970).
Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495.
156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
101 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). In Hutton, the president of a local college
directed students at the college not to board with the plaintiff because she refused to
.dismiss a boarder with whom the president had a dispute.
" Cf. Tuttle v. Black, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) (commercial boycott done
solely to drive competitor out of business and irrespective of any personal profit is ac-
tionable tort).
103 See text accompanying notes 90-99 supra.
I See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 767 (1939) (nonexclusive list of factors courts should
use in balancing interests of parties)
105 For an interesting analysis of the pre-1962 noncommercial boycott cases, see Coons,
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The common law approach delineated above has been greatly
modified by subsequent legislation, especially the Sherman Act..8 and
the National Labor Relations Act.117 The editors of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts deleted the quite extensive materials dealing with com-
petitive privilege in business and labor union settings on the ground that
tort principles no longer have an important role to play for the law's
development in these areas.0 8 Traditional tort principles still apply to
nontrader cases. 0 9
B. The Antitrust Laws
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act."0 Its purpose
was to supplement market forces in regulating the economy."' Prior to
1890, most experts believed that the evils of monopoly could not arise in
a free market."' Unless the state interfered to insulate the monopolist
from competition, new firms, attracted by high profits, would eventually
enter the monopolist's market."' The appearance of the "Trusts" which
dominated several industries for substantial periods of time weakened
supra note 68, at 729-46; see also Green, supra note 85, at 577-582 (expressing a slightly dif-
ferent perspective on these boycott cases).
1" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
"0 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). Although tort law recognized the right of workers to
organize, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met) 111, -, (1842), the courts consistently
used tort doctrines to restrict union activities. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mit-
chell, 245 U.S. 229, 252 (1917) (malice doctrine); Vegelahn v. Gunber, 167 Mass. 92, -, 44
N.E. 1077, - (1896) (contractural interference doctrine). This hostility to labor activism
was the product of both class distinctions and legal standards grounded in property and con-
tract law. See R. SMITH & L. MERRIFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW
38 (rev. ed. 1960). As a result of the courts' unwillingness to respond to the electorate's
growing support for the labor movement, legislation replaced common law torts as the law
governing organized labor. Id. at 39.
Despite this legislative action, the courts remained hostile to granting organized labor
any real power. Early attempts at legislation on labor matters were struck down by the
Supreme Court as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (strik-
ing Kansas statute prohibiting yellow dog contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
180 (1908) (striking federal statute regulating railroad labor relations). Only in the midst of
the great depression did the Court rule such statutes constitutional. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 43 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act);
Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 400, 300 U.S. 515, 557 (1937) (upholding amended
Railway Labor Act).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 708-951, Introduction at vii-viii (1979).
' See text accompanying notes 159-170 infra.
110 See 26 Stat. 209 (1980), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The statute was enacted
in response to the widespread demand for government control of private economic power.
See generally W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA (1965); H. THORELLI, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1954) [hereinafter cited as THORELLI].
11 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). C. KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959).
" See THORELLI, supra note 110, at 109-117, 564-68.
11 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
82-83 (1776).
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this traditional belief. The Trusts were proof that monopoly could con-
tinue indefinitely without state aid. Furthermore, the common law
seemed powerless to prevent these unwanted developments. Agree-
ments between competitors to limit rivalry were unenforceable as con-
tracts in restraint of trade,"' but outsiders injured by these agreements
were without recourse.1 1 5 As noted in the last section,1 8 this position
generally prevailed even if the purpose of the agreement was to elimi-
nate the outsider from the industry.117 Finally, the malice formula vir-
tually precluded relief for anyone harmed by the unilateral action of a
rival. What was needed was a federal statute to protect and promote
competition affirmatively. The statute should be designed to prohibit
those practices which prevented the market from functioning properly.
Such is the task of the Sherman Act.
118
In contrast to the common law, competition in the antitrust area is
used in Friedman's economic sense rather than in the sense of rivalry
between individuals.1 9 The emphasis is on the competitive process, not
on individual competitors. ' In an antitrust case, the issue is stated in
terms of whether the challenged conduct impairs competitive values."'
Of course, there has been continuing dispute since 1890 as to the values
and goals competition should foster.ln Nevertheless, the change from the
1 See Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B. 598, 605.
" "No case can be found in which it was ever held that, at common law, a contract or
agreement in general restraint of trade was actionable at the instance of third parties or
could constitute the foundation for such an action." Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223,
-, 55 N.W. 1119, 1121 (1893). One year later, the Indiana Supreme Court expressly refus-
ed to follow Bohn and its cited authorities, and granted a private plaintiff a cause of action
in tort for injuries caused by defendants' illegal conduct. Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592,
-' 36 N.E. 345, 352-53 (1894).
" See text accompanying notes 74-81 supra.
11 Most significantly of all, government could not intervene to disrupt the trusts. As
Thorelli indicates, the lack of public prosecution and inadequate penalties highlighted the in-
sufficiency of the common law. THORELLI, supra note 110, at 53.
I See 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890) (Senator Sherman's view of purpose of Act).
See generally D. DEWEY, THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1969).
Il Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (citing Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294, 320 (1962)).
It is competition, not competitors, which the [Clayton] Act protects. But we can-
not fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protec-
tion of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occa-
sional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). One cannot read this quotation
without recognizing the ambivalence of the Supreme Court as to the purposes it was pursu-
ing, and what it thought competition signified. See Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Anti-
trust, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 363, 372-73 (1965). [hereinafter cited as Bork & Bowman].
11 The values of competition include efficiency, full employment, and price stability.
See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, 6-25 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA].
In Compare Bork & Bowman, supra note 120 with Blake & Jones, In Defense of An-
titrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 376 (1965).
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common law approach is crucial. Under traditional tort doctrine, one or
more defendants could assert the privilege of competition so long as
business rivalry with the plaintiff was demonstrated. The effect of the
challenged activity on competition in the market was irrelevant.' In an-
titrust the focus is upon how the defendant's actions affect the market-
place. The mere assertion that the purpose of challenged activity was to
further one's competitive interest against rivals is never sufficient
standing alone.124
For example, section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids single firm
monopolizing.'25 Activity, the sole purpose of which is to obtain complete
control of an industry, is proscribed."' In common law tort terms, this
section expands the concept of malicious injury to efforts designed to
achieve monopoly. Thus, if my purpose is to destroy my competitor to
achieve market control, the common law mixed motive formula will not
protect me under section 2.' 2 On the other hand, if I gain market control
due solely to superior efficiency, there is no Sherman Act violation even
though my competitor is destroyed. Where I have succeeded in the com-
petitive struggle by presenting a superior product at a price which can-
not be matched, competitive values have not been offended."
Due to the potential overlap with the Conspiracy Statute, a more ex-
tended examination of section 1 of the Sherman Act seems in order. Sec-
tion 1" governs joint activity.3 ' Joint activity can usefully be divided into
two types, that which is intended to limit competition between parties to
the agreement (internal restraints), and that which is employed to ex-
clude or inhibit outsiders to the combination from competing (external
restraints). 3' An agreement by A and B to hold prices above the market
"' See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
See KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210 (1959).
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
" See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953).
See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 5-39 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as SULLIVAN].
'" See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1911). In Stan-
dard Oil the defendant allegedly engaged in various predatory practices to destroy its com-
petitors. The Court found that Standard Oil violated the Sherman Act, although its ac-
tivities would have been permissible at common law. See id- at 55,76-77. Cf. Katz v. Kapper,
7 Cal. App.2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935) (defendant's boycott legal under common law).
1" See note 126 supra. Defendants may find it difficult to prove that greater efficiency
is the sole cause of their market power.
12 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. 1 (1976).
120 See generally Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950).
131 Both internal and external restraints are used to improve the firm's market position.
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level,'32 the archetype of internal restraints, ordinarily will not adversely
affect the position of their competitor C. On the contrary, the opposite
result is more likely."' On the other hand, if manufacturers A and B join
forces to induce R, a large retailer, not to deal with C, C's opportunity to
compete with the combination may be greatly curtailed."4 The A, B, & R
boycott is the classic external restraint."' The Conspiracy Statute
applies only to external restraints."8
How would Boutwell v. Marr come out under Section 1? Beyond
question the holding and rationale of the Vermont court would be
adopted.117 The defense that the boycott was simply a form of com-
petitive strategy promoting group interest would be rejected. A boycott
used by a powerful group poses great danger to competition since the
opportunities of outsiders to compete are severely curtailed. This
method of obtaining market control does not foster competitive goals
such as lower prices and better quality of products. Rather, its purpose
is simply to isolate competitors from necessary trade relationships" for
the defendant's benefit.
139
Suppose the defendants' purposes are more socially acceptable.
Assume that the defendants design and manufacture dresses. When
they discover that some of their competitors are copying their designs
and selling dresses in competition with them, the defendants inform
their retailers that if the retailers buy goods from the style pirates, the
defendants as a group (a very powerful organization) will refuse to deal.
To the government's claim that this boycott violated section 1, they re-
spond that they were simply enforcing state law which treated such
All business strategy, legitimate and illegitimate, is aimed at this goal. The dichotomy bet-
ween internal and external restraints is more fully developed in Carstensen, Annual Survey
of Antitrust Developments, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 3-22 (1978).
" The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act absolutely prohibits cartels and
price-fixing agreements. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
218 (1940) (price-fixing is per se violation).
"' C is in a position to sell above the market level and yet undercut both A and B. For
these reasons, C should be able to increase the number of sales and the profit per sale. C's
independence of the cartel is a prime reason why A and B's contract may be unprofitable
unless C is included. See McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Mer-
chant Marine, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 191, 197-204 (1960) (organizations and functions of cartels).
1 See text accompanying note 88 supra; note 66 supra.
"5Like price-fixing, boycotts are absolutely forbidden by § 1. See note 132 supra. In an-
titrust terminology, the Supreme Court has declared price fixing and boycotts illegal per se.
Id. Once an arrangement is characterized as either price fixing or a boycott, no justifications
are permitted. The characterization of an activity as a boycott, however, is often difficult.
See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 135-67 (1976).
"5 See text accompanying notes 184-189 infra.
"5 Cf. Eastern State Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614
(1914) (conspiracy violating § 1).
' See Buxbaum, Boycotts and Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, 64 MICH. L. REv.
671, 675 (1966).
" See SULLIVAN, supra note 126, § 83.
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copying as tortious. In sum, the guild asserts a form of self-help
privilege. 4 ' In FTC v. Fashion Originators Guild of America4. the
Supreme Court emphatically rejected this argument, holding that where
the purpose is to exclude, such a "combination is in reality an extra-
governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and
restraint of interstate commerce... and this 'trenches upon the power of
the national legislature and vitiates the [Antitrust] Statute."'' ' The
defendant Guild was not permitted to act as a quasi-licensing agency
authorizing competition on terms satisfactory to it.' This rationale ap-
plies to all similar exclusionary activities involving powerful groups."'
This is not to say that every external restraint intended to exclude
competitors necessarily violates Section 1. Antitrust courts often are
compelled to decide whether the reasons for excluding a competitor are
sufficiently meritorious to uphold the restrictive conduct.' In fact, ex-
clusions have been upheld where such was necessary either to make the
market perform more efficiently 4 ' or to allow firms to obtain the full
benefits of a semi-integration.'47 Moreover, in those cases in which the
defendant justifies the exclusion on one of these two grounds, the
courts may also require that the method used be the least restrictive
,, See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940)
(self-help remedy permitted if defendants show retailer participated in torts to gain access
to designs); Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., 90 F.2d 556, 560-61
(1st Cir. 1937) (defense accepted in antitrust case); Wolfenstein v. Fashion Originators' Guild
of Am., 244 A.D. 656, 659-61, 280 N.Y.S. 361, 366-67 (1935) (injunction against boycott
denied).
141 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
"' Id. at 465-66 (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242
(1899)).
143 Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357-61 (1963) (overlap with
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 permits limited self-regulation by New York Stock Ex-
change).
I See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945); Gamco, Inc. v. Pro-
vidence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 487, cert denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952). See
also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 58-59 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BORK] (novel
analysis of Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)).
1 While concerted refusals to deal, or boycotts, are said to be illegal per se, see note
135 supra, not all arrangements with boycott characteristics should be declared unlawful
automatically. Professor Sullivan distinguishes sharply between the classic boycott, which
is designed to drive competitors out of business or to coerce them into price fixing or other
antitrust violations, and concerted refusals to deal which seek only to regulate trade in a
manner not inimical to competition (e.g. by adopting uniform contract terms to facilitate
price comparison by buyers). See Sullivan, supra note 126, §§ 90-92. Commentators general-
ly have followed Sullivan's treatment of boycotts. See, e.g., Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Con-
certed Refusals to Dea: A Rule Ripe For Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 685,
703-17 (1979) (different schemes for applying per se rule).
14 See SULLIVAN, supra note 126, §§ 76, 87-88; Note, Trade Association Exclusionary
Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1486, 1486-87
(1966).
" See SULLIVAN, supra note 126, §§ 77, 89; Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under
the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1531, 1536-38 (1958).
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alternative." ' For our purposes, the significant point is that the kinds of
permissible justifications have become increasingly fixed for reasons of
judicial administration."' In a tort case, on the other hand, the range of
acceptable justifications seems to be more varied. 150
Yet, one must be careful not to draw too clear a line between an-
titrust and tort cases. There are a number of cases in which the courts
have condemned as antitrust violations behavior which harms a com-
petitor but which does not seem dangerous to competition in the eco-
nomic sense."' For example, in Klor's v. Broadway Hale's Stores, Inc.,"2
plaintiff alleged that a retail competitor induced several important
manufacturers to boycott it. To this boycott allegation defendant moved
for summary judgment on the ground that no injury to competition could
be shown. Defendant supported its motion with affidavits showing that
there were a large number of retailers competing in this market and
that the loss of one could not harm the public.' The Supreme Court
overruled the demurrer on the ground that the allegation showed a
boycott and boycotts were inherently harmful to competition.'TM
Given the ease of entry into retailing, the conclusion that the
boycott of Klor's could impair competition seems questionable. The facts
seem to show a "purely private quarrel."' A personal dispute rather
", See Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 656 (2d Cir. 1957).
" See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRIN-
CIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 314 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA & TURNER].
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766(b) (1977).
"' See note 157 infra. Similarly, many of the dealer termination cases might be viewed
as essentially tort problems. The varying results in these suits are carefully explored by
Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the ShermanAc Populism & Relational Power,
53 TEX. L. REV. 1180 (1975).
12 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
1' Id. at 210. By neither amending its complaint or submitting conflicting affadavits,
plaintiff maintained that the Sherman Act prohibits a combination seeking to eliminate a
single trader regardless of market effects. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-10, Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) reprinted in 5 ANTITRUST LAW: MAJOR
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955 TERM
-1975 TERM 373-81 (P. Kurland & G. Caspar, eds. 1979). [hereinafter cited as MAJOR BRIEFS].
5 110 U.S. at 212-214.
The combination clearly has, by its "nature" and "character" a "monopolistic
tendency." As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one
merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to
the economy. Monopoly can surely thrive by the elimination of such small
businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups. In
recognition of this fact, the Sherman Act has consistently been read to forbid all
contracts and combinations "which tend to create a monopoly," whether "the
tendency is a creeping one" or "one that proceeds at full gallop."
Id. at 213-14. (quoting International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 302, 396 (1947) (foot-
note omitted)).
In analyzing Broadway-Hale's boycott, the Ninth Circuit characterized the dispute
between the two stores as a private "squabble." Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
255 F.2d 214, 234 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). The court of appeals attempted
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than competition in the economic sense seems to be the subject matter
of the case. Professor Rah's comments about Klor's appear pertinent:
As a legal concept, protection of competition has meant not
an economic measure of so many sellers, so many buyers, specific
heights of barriers to entry, and so forth. It has meant preven-
tion of whatever kinds of conduct at the time seemed inconsis-
tent with the preservation of a free, private enterprise society.
Certain types of behavior, among them boycotts, have been con-
demned more because they are socially objectional dirty tricks
than because they are clearly perceived as a real threat of mono-
poly.
156
Many recent antitrust cases might be included in the list of "dirty
tricks" decisions."' The point is that the court treated Klor's much like a
tort case. In essence it found a malicious injury. Plaintiff alleged harm
caused by an intentional action, and the defendant offered no acceptable
justification.158 The focus was on the relationship of the parties and the
unjustified damage inflicted on the competitor, rather than the com-
petitive process.
to decide the case on economic standards of competition. The court characterized antitrust's
goal as preserving public markets which provide consumers adequate alternatives in terms
of price, quality, and service. Id. at 231. Since no significant change in the structure of this
market was threatened through the elimination of Klor's, the court failed to find any harm
to competition in the economic sense. Id. at 235.
"' Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act. Some Reflections on the
Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (1959) (emphasis added).
15" See, e.g., Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distributing Co., 353 F.2d 618, 620-21
(10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966); Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Wood-
bury Corp., 57 F.2d 96, 97-99 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932). In Pick-Barth, plain-
tiffs employees conspired with its competitor to lure away customers and misappropriate
customer lists, cost readings and other necessary data of the plaintiff. Although the con-
spirators' action was tortions, see 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
29 (1973), the First Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding of a § 1 violation even though
there was no showing that the plaintiff would be driven from the market or that competi-
tion would have been impaired. It was only necessary that the defendant intended to harm
the plaintiff without justification. 57 F.2d at 102. See generally Note, Antitrust Treatment
of Competitive Torts: An Argument for a Rule of Per Se Legality Under the Sherman Act,
58 TEX. L. REV. 416 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Treatment] (discussing history of
Pick-Barth doctrine) Recently, however, the First Circuit retreated somewhat from its
holding Pick-Barth. In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc., 508 F.2d 547
(1st Cir. 1974), the court affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of an antitrust claim based on
tortious actions directed at the plaintiff even though it characterized the defendant's actions
as an "aggregation of dirty tricks." Id. at 559. It should be noted that the activities con-
demned in Pick-Barth could well increase competition in the economic sense. See 3 AREEDA
& TURNER, supra note 149, 738; Antitrust Treatment, supra at 425-26.
15 In oral argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for KIor's argued that
Broadway-Hale organized the boycott to retaliate against plaintiffs price cutting activity.
Rebuttal Argument of Petitioner at 10 (Feb. 26, 1959) reprinted in MAJOR BRIEFS, supra
note 108, at 454.
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Most authorities"9 agree that the antitrust laws apply only to com-
mercial activities. According to Dean Rostow, the "Sherman Act largely
concerns the behavior of businessmen, and their plans for making as
much money as possible under the circumstances of their market posi-
tion." 6 Thus, in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Association of Colleges & Secondary Schools,' a nonprofit association
which accredited colleges refused to examine or certify a proprietary
school. The Association's members were all nonproprietary schools. This
refusal was held not to violate the Sherman Act on the ground that non-
commercial matters were beyond the purview of the antitrust laws.
Recent decisions have narrowed this exception. In Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar 6' the Supreme Court brought the business activities
of the learned professions within the antitrust realm. Subsequently, in
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States," the Court
adamantly refused to let the defendants use "ethical rules" to subvert
price competition. What the Court seems to have done in these cases is
admit that profit motives play such an important part in the activities of
the learned professions that the public needs the protection of the anti-
trust laws. No doubt Goldfarb and Society of Engineers will make
courts increasingly sensitive to the existence of business motives. This
new perspective ought to change the result in Marjorie Webster. The
facts there indicated that the nonproprietary schools profited by maintain-
ing their advantage in the market for students. The school's self-interest
in suppressing competition for students was as strong as the Fashion
Originators Guild's in seeking sales of dresses.6 Nonetheless, these
learned profession decisions do not overrule the basic proposition stated
by Dean Rostow; rather, they reflect a growing awareness of what
should be classified as profit-making activity under the antitrust laws. 65
At this juncture, a brief note of the celebrated National Organization
of Women (NOW) boycott of various business enterprises in Missouri for
the purpose of encouraging passage of the Equal Rights Amendment
Compare Coons, supra note 68, at 727 and Note, Now or Never. Is There Antitrust
Liability for Non-Commercial Boycotts, 80 COLum. L. REV. 1317, 1339-40 (1980) (taking posi-
tion that antitrust laws only apply to business activities and comprehensively listing
authorities in agreement) with Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 1131, 1164-65 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Protest Boycotts] (taking opposite
position).
'1 See Rostow, Monoploy Under the Sherman Act- Power on Purpose, 43 ILL. L. REV.
745, 771 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Rostow].
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
16 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
1 See Note, Antitrust Laws-College Accrediting Association's Refusal to Evaluate
Proprietarp College Held Not a Sherman Act Violation, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1917 (1971)
(criticizing decision in Marjorie Webster).
11 See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
695-96 (1978).
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seems appropriate.'68 The state of Missouri attempted to enjoin the
boycott, charging that it violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.16 NOW,
of course, argued that noncommercial boycotts are beyond the scope of
the Sherman Act. Both the District Court and the Eighth Circuit refused
to pass on this argument.168 Instead, both courts found the NOW boycott
within the Noerr8 9 exemption, holding that the defendant's activity con-
stituted attempts to influence legislative action in Missouri to which the
Sherman Act did not apply. We will assume, with Rostow, that the
broader ground is correct and that nontrader cases like Gott and NOW
are beyond the reach of section 1.170
C. The Wisconsin Statute
A Wisconsin statute originally enacted in 1887 is substantively iden-
tical to Virginia's Conspiracy Statute." Its remedies, however, are less
drastic. Only a criminal penalty was imposed for violations,'72 although a
'" Missouri v. National Organization of Women, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), affd,
620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
.67 Id. at 1302. In addition to the Sherman Act claim, Missouri asserted claims under
the Missouri Antitrust Act and a common law tort claim, arguing that NOW had inten-
tionally inflicted harm without legal excuse. 467 F. Supp. at 291. The Eigth Circuit held that
Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961),
required a verdict for defendant on those state claims as well as the federal one. 620 F.2d at
1319.
467 F.2d at 305; 620 F.2d at 1319.
169 We think it equally clear that the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more
persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or
the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce
a restraint or monopoly. Although such associations could perhaps, through a
process of expansive construction be brought within the general prescription of
"combination[s] ... in restraint of trade," they bear little resemblence to the
combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act....
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136
(1961).
"' One commentator has suggested that the Noerr doctrine, see note 169 supra, has no
application to the type of factual situation presented in the NOW case. See Protest
Boycotts, supra note 159, at 1140-45. We agree. We differ with the writer's position that the
antitrust laws should apply to noncommercial boycotts. Instead, the better result would have
been merely to exempt noncommercial activity from the antitrust laws. Our principal objec-
tion to application of the antitrust laws in this context is the same one we would have to ap-
plication of the Virginia Conspiracy Statute: we don't see the benefits of imposing treble
damages on protest boycotts. Since state tort law imposes compensatory damages and, if
necessary, punitive damages, it seems perfectly suited to handle the matter. Moreover,
most protest boycotts are likely to be of short duration and without lasting commercial
effects. Finally, if one were to follow this commentator's suggested analysis for applying the
antitrust laws to protest boycotts, the considerations used are precisely those employed in a
torts case. Compare Protest Boycotts, supra note 159, 1140-45 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 766(b) (1977).
... See WISC. STAT. ANN. § 134.01 (West 1974).
.72 The only penalty provided by the statute is imprisonment for not more than one
year or a fine of not more than five hundred dollars. Id.
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private cause of action was implied."" The only activities excluded from
the statute's ambit were those of labor unions. '74
A trial under this statute proceeds much like one in a traditional
business tort case. A private plaintiff must prove an agreement between
defendants to harm his business, and an act performed pursuant to such
agreement done willfully (not inadvertently) and maliciously (without
privilege) causing harm to the business."5 Ordinarily such proof will not
be difficult. The crucial issue under the statute will be that of
privilege. 7 ' To decide this issue a court will consider not only the defen-
dants' purposes but the methods employed to fulfill them. The burden of
proving the legitimacy of both the goals and the methods used appears to
be on the defendant.
77
While there have not been many Wisconsin cases dealing with the
Injury to Business Part of its statute, it has become clear that the
statute does limit the scope of the privilege of competition. For example,
recall the classic boycott situation of Boutwell v. Marr.178 Such conduct
generally was permitted at common law as a proper method to protect
competitive interests. In Hawarden v. Youghiogheny & L. Coal Co., 79
however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly rejected this defense.
7 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin frequently has held that if a violation of § 134.01
causes damage to a person, that person has a cause of action for that violation See, e.g.,
Radue v. Dill, 74 Wis.2d 239, 245, 246 N.W.2d 407, 511 (1976); Judevine v. Benzies-Montange
Fuel & Wholesale Co., 222 Wis. 512, -, 269 N.W. 295, 301 (1936); Boyce v. Independent
Cleaners, Inc., 206 Wis. 521, -, 240 N.W. 132, 135 (1932), Randall v. Lonstrof, 126 Wis.
147, -, 105 N.W. 663, 664 (1905). The Wisconsin Supreme Court also has held that an
overt act is not necessary for a civil action to arise under the statute. The only prerequisite
to a civil suit under § 134.01 is that damage actually occur to the victim. See Radue v. Dill,
74 Wis.2d 239, 245, 246 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1976); White v. White, 132 Wis. 121, 129, 111 N.W.
1116, 1119 (1907).
174 A strike conducted to enforce the labor demands of a union is not an activity pro-
hibited by § 134.01. As long as the union is acting in good faith and is pursing lawful pur-
poses, a strike will not be enjoined under § 134.01 unless the union uses unlawful means to
achieve their lawful purposes. See Iron Molders' Union Local 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166
F. 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1908).
175 State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, -, 85 N.W. 1046, 1062-65 (1901). Heugin was a
criminal case but the court did outline the essential elements of a private cause of action. Id.
See also Cohn v. Zippel, 12 Wis.2d 258, -, 107 N.W.2d 184, 185 (1961); Judevine v.
Benzies-Montange Fuel & Wholesale Co., 222 Wis. 512, -, N.W. 295, 301 (1936); Martens
v. Reilly, 109 Wis. 464, -, 84 N.W. 840, 843-44 (1901).
'7' See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 612 (1956).
" "We note that in order to maintain this action [under the statute], the plaintiff must
prove that the defendants' purpose was as alleged, for if it appears that the defendants' pur-
pose was solely to protect their own interests . . ., then the conspiracy falls from the pur-
'view of [the statute]" Radue v. Dill, 74 Wis.2d 239, 245, 246 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1976).
Presumably, the defendant must show that the interest was legitimate. See text accompany-
ing notes 78-81 supra.
178 See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
',' 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
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Business boycotts placed too much power to harm rivals in the hands of
the group to be tolerated. 8 '
The Wisconsin experience as yet is insufficient to give definitive
answers to several significant questions. Does the statute apply to non-
trader cases? In business cases, how should it be coordinated with the
state's antitrust laws? What common law privileges other than competi-
tion are available under the statute? Some general remarks by Wiscon-
sin state and federal courts are of assistance in dealing with all three. On
several occasions Wisconsin courts have stated that the statute codifies
the common law. 8' Since injuries to business inflicted by nontraders
were governed by the common law, presumably cases like Gott v. Berea
College would be within the province of the statute. Does the statute
mandate a plaintiff's victory here as it did in Hawarden? An affirmative
answer could be supported on the ground that the statute displays a
legislative design to forbid all boycotts interfering with business. Yet,
this runs counter to the general Wisconsin position authorizing defen-
dants to justify their conduct. Possibly, the statute increases the burden
on the defendant to demonstrate that the interest asserted is of great
social value and the method employed is the least restrictive necessary
to attain the desired result. In this light the Hawarden defendants were
seeking a legitimate goal-an improved competitive position-but em-
ployed a method which, for the reasons stated by the Vermont court in
Boutwell, could not be permitted. 8' A similar rationale could change the
result in Gott also.'
83
On the matter of the relation between the antitrust laws and the
Conspiracy Statute, the Wisconsin decisions have stated that the two
operate independently, for both were intended to forbid combinations
stiffling competition.' This explains the existence of complimentary
It is undoubtedly true that, in the absence of any statute to the contrary,
several persons may combine for the purpose of increasing their business and
making great gains by any legitimate means, and if, as the incidental result of
the combination, others are driven out of business, there is no actionable wrong
.... It may at once be admitted that his sort of reasoning has been adopted by
some of the courts which have been called upon to deal with the subject. It has
not, however, been adopted by this court; in fact in the very recent case of
State v. Huegin .... it was, in effect, repudiated.
111 Wis. 545, -, 87 N.W. 472, 474 (1901). A reading of the case indicates, moreover, that
the Wisconsin court was of the opinion that a boycott was illegal at common law. This ex-
plains the court's comment in Huegin that the Conspiracy Statute merely restates the com-
mon law. See State v. Heugin, 110 Wis. 189, -, 85 N.W. 1046, 1064 (1901).
"I See e.g., State ex rel. Nordell v. Kinney, 62 Wis.2d 558, 561-62, 215 N.W.2d 405, 407
(1974); State v. Heugin, 110 Wis. 189, -, 85 N.W. 1046, 1064 (1901).
18 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra. One would assume that today courts
would focus more on the necessity of a total boycott to carry out the school's purpose and
the legitimacy of the purpose and less on the defendant's status as an educator. Cf. Coons,
supra note 68, at 120-21.
'" See, e.g., State ex reL Nordell v. Kinney, 62 Wis.2d 558, 561-62, 215 N.W.2d 405, 407
(1974); State v. Heugin, 110 Wis. 189, -, 85 N.W. 1046, 1064 (1901).
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standards. The antitrust laws prohibit combinations which unduly
restrain competition, while the statute forbids malicious injury to
traders. From this perspective let us reconsider Fashion Originators
Guild and Klor's. Fashion Originators Guild presented a situation to
which the antitrust laws clearly apply. For antitrust purposes all com-
mercial boycotts are suspect since any joint efforts to exclude rivals by a
powerful group may limit competition. " Assume a style pirate sued the
guild. Whether the boycott would be wrongful under the statute is
unclear. This situation may be distinguished from Hawarden. The Guild
relied on more than mere self-interest. Indeed, it asserted that its
actions were simply an example of permissible self help to enforce a
recognized state policy. Just as one may use force to reclaim personal
property from a thief while in fresh pursuit,'88 so the Guild could use self-
help to protect their property against theft by the style pirates.' These
defendants could have presented a strong argument that their legal
remedy was inadequate.'88 A court also might find that the plaintiff came
into equity with unclean hands.'89 Thus, even in cases involving purely
pecuniary interests, the Wisconsin statute might permit boycotts which
violate the antitrust laws.
The Klor's case may indicate the other side of the coin. Assuming
that the defendants proved no justification for organizing their alleged
boycott against the plaintiff other than the contention that retail com-
petition could not be harmed by Klor's demise, a plaintiff might be
limited to nonantitrust relief. 0 As suggested earlier,' a judge might
'" See text accompanying notes 141-144 supra.
18 See PROSSER, supra note 3, § 22. The rationale behind the self-help remedy in torts is
that there are some instances where pursuing legal remedies may be inadequate or ineffec-
tive because of the time involved in pursuing those remedies. Id The privilege of using
force in reclaiming stolen personal property, however, is restricted to only unusual cases.
Id. A similar self-help defense exists in defamation cases. See Shenkman v. O'Malley, 2
A.D.2d 567, 574-577, 157 N.Y.S.2d 290, 297-300 (1957). See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d
1083 (1972).
' See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940) (self-help
remedy permitted if defendants show retailers participated in torts to gain access to
designs); Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., 90 F.2d 445, 560-61
(1st Cir. 1937) (defense accepted in antitrust case); Wolfenstein v. Fashion Originators'
Guild, 244 A.D. 656, 659-61, 280 N.Y.S. 361, 366-67 (1935) (injunction against boycott denied).
1" Copying original but non-copyrighted designs is permissible. See, Cheney Bros. v.
Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. 27 (2d Cir. 1929).
I" See Wolfenstein v. Fashion Originators' Guild, 244 A.D. 656, 660, 280 N.Y.S. 361, 367
(1935).
1"0 Professor Posner recommends that when relief is not available under federal an-
titrust law, the victims of exclusionary boycotts should seek remedies under state tort law.
See Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 532-35
(1974). [hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Practices]. Similarly, another commentator has
suggested that there is no need to stretch the antitrust laws to these types of boycotts. The
same result could be reached under the doctrine of tortious interference with business rela-
tions. See Callmann, supra note 81, at 131.
"I1 See text accompanying notes 151-158 supra.
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properly hold, "there is no antitrust violation since competition has not
been harmed, but this fact does not license defendants to harm plaintiffs
business unlawfully. Our Conspiracy Statute was designed to give plain-
tiff a remedy in these circumstances. See Hawarden. Plaintiff has shown
injury to business due to defendant's actions, and defendants have of-
fered no permissible justification." Of course, our treatment of Fashion
Originators Guild and Klor's is hypothetical. There is an excellent
chance that a Wisconsin court would hold both defendants liable under
either section 1 or its Conspiracy Statute. The basis would be that the
coverage of the two acts coincide in situations involving boycotts. The
overlap between the two in this regard is apparent. Our point is that
such a view is not inevitable.
D. A Proposed Construction of the "Injuries to Business" Part of the
Virginia Conspiracy Statute.
At present Virginia has three remedial schemes governing injuries
to business, the State Antitrust Act,192 common law tort principles, and
the Conspiracy Statute. Over the years the courts have been working
out an accommodation between the first two. 9 ' In cases involving
business rivals, the competitive values of antitrust generally are
employed, while in those cases beyond the scope of such laws the defen-
dant is relegated to his common law remedies. Plaintiffs ordinarily
choose the antitrust route to recovery, when the option is open to them,
because the relief authorized, especially triple damages, so far exceeds
that offered by the common law.' Viewed in this light, the Conspiracy
Statute is a sleeping giant. From the point of view of the private plain-
tiff, its mandatory triple damage remedy is equal to that authorized by
the federal act and greater than those authorized by state law. 9 ' As sug-
gested in the preceeding section, the Conspiracy Statute has the poten-
tial to supercede both of the state's other remedial schemes in this
area.99 Since the interpretation given the statute could alter radically
existing law in this area, careful consideration of this matter is
necessary. We shall offer four possible constructions of the statute, in-
dicating the superiority of the fourth.
19 SEE VA. CODE §§ 59.1-9.1 - .18 (1980). See also Walsh, Virginia Antitrust Act in
VIRGINIA STATE BAR ANTITRUST NEWS LETTER, 2-4 (Aug. 1980).
19 See note 81 supra.
9 See Exclusionary Practices, supra note 190, at 532-35; Callman, supra note 81, at
131.
195 The Virginia Antitrust Act authorizes a person threatened with injury because of a
violation of its provisions to file for an injunction, collect damages, the cost of the suit and
attorney's fees. In flagrant circumstances, the aggrieved party may collect not more than
three times the amount of actual damages. See VA. CODE § 59.1-9.12(a)(b)(1980). The federal
law, however, mandates treble damages in private suits for antitrust violations. See 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
19 See text accompanying notes 184-190 supra.
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First, the statute could be viewed as codifying the common law. It
would condemn all joint activity intended to inflict harm on a business
unless the defendant demonstrated a privilege. The traditional balancing
technique would be employed. Thus, on facts like those presented in
Boutwell v. Marr,'97 a Virginia court would balance the interest of the
parties in deciding if the defendant's boycott was privileged. The actual
result could not be predicted. A second approach better seems to em-
body the legislative purpose.198 Following the example of the Wisconsin
court in Hawarden, a court might declare that boycotts to protect
business interests are never legitimate on the ground that the clear pur-
pose of the statute was to alter the common law to this extent at least.
Other insufficient defenses would have to be worked out on a case-by-
case basis.
Under either of these closely related interpretations, the statute
would be given a life of its own apart from the state antitrust laws. At
the same time, the state antitrust laws would become superfluous. Both
statutes apply to business cases and under the second construction, both
require similar results, but the Conspiracy Statute grants the plaintiff
better remedies.199 Only an inept attorney would rely solely upon the
Virginia antitrust statutes."'
Further militating against either construction is the recognized
close relationship between these two statutes. The Conspiracy Statute
originally was part of the state's antitrust laws."0' Two years after its
enactment, the legislature shifted the Conspiracy Statute to the criminal
part of the Code and added the specific remedy of mandatory three-fold
damages, cost of suit, reasonable attorney's fees, and an injuction. 2
These civil sanctions appear to have been carried over from the Anti-
trust Act."'0 In 1974, however, as part of a complete revision of these
statutes, the legislature changed the civil remedy under the antitrust
laws to single damages except in flagrant cases.2"4
, See text accompanying notes 87-92 supra.
, s See text accompanying notes 13-21 supra.
Compare VA. CODE § 18.2-500(a) (1979) (mandatory triple damages) with VA. CODE §
59.1-9.12(a)(1980) (triple damages awarded only in flagrant circumstances).
"I We realize that many, probably most, private antitrust claims would be brought
under the federal act. Yet, it appears that the Virginia legislature has its own scheme for
handling various kinds of injuries to business. This is the focus of our inquiry.
21 See VA. CODE § 59-21.1 (Supp. 1962).
See VA. CODE § 18.2-74.1:1(a)(b) (1964). In addition to the remedies of treble damages,
cost of suit, reasonable attorney's fees and injunction, the 1964 version of the Conspiracy
Statute included an immunity provision and a constitutional severability clause. Id.
The 1950 Antitrust Act provided for the same remedies as the 1964 Conspiracy
Statute. See VA. CODE §§ 59-26, -32 (1950).
20, See VA. CODE § 59.1-9.12 (1980); see also Nineteenth Annual Survey of
Developments in Virginia Law: 1973-1974, 60 VA. L. REV. 1461-63 (1974). The Virginia An-
titrust Act no longer carries a criminal penalty. But cf. VA. CODE § 59.1-68.6 (1980 Supp.)
(felony bid rigging statute).
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It is submitted that this repeal of the mandatory triple damages pro-
vision is crucial to a proper construction of the Conspiracy Statute. The
legislature must have intended for the two statutes to serve different
purposes.2 0 5 This suggests the third possible construction of the Con-
spiracy Statute. A court might hold that if a case is within the purview
of the state Antitrust Act, the Conspiracy Statute is not applicable.
Rather, the latter must have been intended as a true antitrust supple-
ment, governing conduct beyond the scope of these laws. Otherwise,
price fixing or monopoly could be treated more leniently than boycotts, a
peculiar result."' Yet while this alternative seems preferable to the com-
mon law or Wisconsin approach, it too presents problems. If used against
nontraders, such as the college president in Gott,'0 who organized non-
commercial boycotts, such defendants could be treated more harshly
than businessmen engaging in anticompetitive activities. Certainly,
there is nothing in the wording of the statute to indicate that such was
the legislature's design.
Rather than any of the three noted above, we offer a fourth construc-
tion. Our proposal requires that the word "maliciously" in the statute be
given a very specific meaning. Malice is an elastic word. Its meaning
changes depending on the context."8 Although originally signifying ill
will or spite,"9 malice in torts more commonly means only that the
2 When provisions of the Antitrust Act conflict with provisions of the Fair Trade Act,
the last enacted controls. Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. 367, 375, 117 S.E.
2d 289, 297 (1960); Benrus Watch Co. v. Kiusch, 198 Va. 94, 98, 92 S.E. 2d 384, 388 (1956).
1 Cf. BORK, supra note 144, at 56 (price fixing and monopoly are principal abuses at
which antitrust was aimed).
See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
See generally, J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 216-18 (1967);
Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 924 (1964). For examle,
the meaning of malice in malicious prosecution cases is two-fold:
A malicious prosecution is one that is begun in malice and if there is no malice
found to exist in fact, the action must fail.
Any feeling of hatred, animosity or ill-will toward the plaintiff, of course, amounts
to malice. But it is not essential to prove such ill-will. Any motive other than that
of instituting the prosecution for the purpose of bringing the parties to justice, is
a malicious motive on the part of the person who acts under the influence of it. If
the defendant knew or actually believed the plaintiff innocent of the charges
made, he acted maliciously. Although the fact that the defendant actually believed
the plaintiff guilty does not conclusively negative malice.
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §4.6, at 320 (1956) (footnotes omitted). In
defamation cases, on the other hand, the meaning of malice has changed drastically over a
period of time. At one time, it meant nothing more than that the defendant's conduct was
unprivileged. Now, there is constitutional malice, which means that the defendant made the
statement knowing it to be false or with reckless disregard for the truth. See C. MORRIS,
MORRIS ON TORTS 359-60 (2d ed. 1979).
See Crawford v. Middletown, 83 Eng. Rep. 308 (1674); Greenwood v. Peick, 79 Eng.
Rep. 78 (1670); see also Hearne v. Stowell, 113 Eng. Rep. 986 (1740).
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challenged behavior was without legal justification. 10 We suggest that in
construing the Conspiracy Statute malice be given its original connnota-
tion: A malicious injury is one inflicted malevolently, for the sake of the
harm as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some further end
legitimately desired."' So construed, the Conspiracy Statute would only
apply if actual ill will were directed at the victim rather than the com-
mon and expected impersonal desire to get the best of one's business
rivals. In short, our fourth and preferred construction adopts the com-
mon law malice formula for this purpose.212 Where the conspirators
entertain mixed motives, malice could not be present. On the other hand,
where only ill will is present, the mandatory triple damage provision of
the Conspiracy Statute relieves the victim of the burden of either con-
vincing a court that a flagrant antitrust violation was involved or of ob-
taining adequate punitive damages under tort rules.21 Such a view
would curtail the ambit of the statute yet permit it to supplement the
antitrust law by punishing inherently antisocial conduct with an ap-
propriately severe remedy.'
To illustrate the working of our preferred construction of the
statute, let us reconsider two business cases, Boutwell v. Marr"5 and
Klor's v. Broadway Hale's Stores, Inc..26 Under our view, the statute
would not be applicable to Boutwet1 since the defendants' purpose was to
improve their competitive position. So long as the defendant's goal is
legitimate, the plaintiff is left to other remedies. Of course, the result is
contrary to Hawarden, but in Wisconsin a private plaintiff is limited to
actual damages.217 The severity of the triple damage remedy mandated
by the Virginia Conspiracy statute compels this difference in result.
Analyzing Klor's under the statute is more complicated. Assuming
that competition in the economic sense would not be harmed by Klor's
210 In State v. Heugin, 110 Wis. 189, -, 85 N.W. 1046, 1062 (1901), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that malice under the original § 134.01 meant "legal malice" which
means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. On appeal, Justice
Holmes upheld the Wisconsin statute largely on the ground that Wisconsin's definition of
malice was well established in tort law. See Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 203 (1904).
21 See Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145,-, 119 N.W. 946,948 (1909); Hutton v. Watters,
132 Tenn. 527, -, 179 S.W. 134, 135 (1975).
212 See text accompanying notes 182-185 supra.
212 See note 199 supra.
21 Adoptation of the common law malice formula for the Conspiracy Statute would also
be consistent with the Virginia court decisions as to when punitive damages are proper. In
Virginia, punitive damages are proper only when the plaintiff can prove actual malice by
showing actual ill will, malevolence or wicked intention. See Jordan v. Suave, 219 Va. 448,
452-53, 247 S.E.2d 739, 741-42 (1978); Lee v. Southerland Corp., 219 Va. 23, 27-8, 244 S.E.2d
756, 759 (1978); Giant of Virginia, Inc. v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 685-86, 152 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1967).
21 See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
211 See text accompanying notes 152-154 supra.
217 See Radue v. Dill, 74 Wis.2d 239, 245, 246 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1976).
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demise, the antitrust laws should not apply.218 Yet, our construction of
the Conspiracy Statute provides plaintiff with a remedy. Since the
defendants' actions served no competitive purpose, and no other
legitimate purpose was suggested, apparently they were actuated by
personal ill will. It is this situation to which the punitive remedy of the
Conspiracy Statute ought to apply. On the other hand, if defendants
demonstrated that their actions did have a lawful goal, Klor's could not
establish malice and would be relegated to traditional tort remedies.219
Our proposed construction of the statute should be applied to non-
trader cases such as Gott. Where defendants demonstrate that the
challenged conduct had a lawful purpose, the statute does not apply.
Such a result leaves the court free to grant the plaintiff a single damage
recovery based on traditional tort principles.' ° In contrast, where the
boycott is organized to satisfy a grudge, clearly an impermissible objec-
tive, triple damages should be granted to deter this defendant and
others. In sum, our proposed construction merely limits the ambit of the
statute but in no way limits a court in dealing with difficult cases such as
Gott. As we view the matter, the triple damage provision may deter
judges from finding liability against noncommercial boycotts because
the remedy is so drastic."
III. Repeal of the Triple Damage Remedy
As the reader must realize, our proposed construction would greatly
reduce the significance of the statute. The statute would be deter-
minative in very few cases. Due to the triple damage provision, this
result is necessary. Without the three-fold damage feature, the statute
probably gives a good result. Certainly the Wisconsin approach il-
lustrated by Hawarden is preferable to the common law majority posi-
tion (our second proposed construction). Requiring defendants to
demonstrate convincingly that the interests they seek to promote
outweigh plaintiffs' right to trade free of such interference and that the
goal could not be achieved in less harmful ways makes sense to us.
218 See text accompanying notes 151-157 supra.
For example, assume Broadway Hale claimed that it had organized the boycott to
discipline Kor's for undercutting the prices of other retailers, a fact averred by Klor's in
oral argument before the Supreme Court. See note 114. While such proof would establish a
business motive on defendant's part, it also demonstrates vividly that Kor's demise would
adversely affect competition and that the antitrust statutes do apply.
See text accompanying notes 90-99 supra.
21 As previously indicated, many attorneys were of the opinion that this statute was to
prevent civil rights sit-ins. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra. Our interpretation
would take the sit-in case outside the purview of the statute. Thus, we would not
discriminate against this form of boycott. This leaves the court free to determine the legali-
ty of the civil rights boycott under constitutional and tort rules. In fact, by removing the tri-
ple damage sanction, courts may be more willing to grant relief to injured plaintiffs since
only compensatory damages ordinarily would be awarded. Cf. 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 149, § 331. (treble damages remedy inhibits finding of liability).
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The triple damage remedy changes the entire complexion of the
statute. What policy is served by this provision? The usual justifications
in the antitrust context are that it is necessary to properly compensate
private plaintiffs, deter would-be wrongdoers, and supplement govern-
ment enforcement of these laws. The case against three-fold damages
under the antitrust laws has been made elsewhere and need not be
repeated.m The case against triple damages under the Conspiracy
Statute is much stronger. Many antitrust violations are both difficult to
detect and to prove."' Price-fixing is an illustration. Where a group of
sellers secretly agree to raise prices, neither their customers nor
government enforcers may realize what is happening.' Without some
kind of punitive damage provision, there would be little economic
disincentive not to cheat. If the price-fixers are caught, they cough up
their illegal gains plus the costs connected with the suit, but if the cartel
either is not discovered or its existence cannot be proved, the sellers
keep their illegal profits. Since many-some believe the great ma-
jority 8- cartels are never discovered, firms have a definite economic in-
centive to fix prices. The mandatory triple damages remedy reduces this
incentive, for business firms recognize that if their illegal activities are
discovered, the damages lost may well exceed the potential gains.'
Contrast the boycott situation with price-fixing. In the former, the
victim is ordinarily aware of the restrictive activities. In most cases, the
defendants will have told the businessmen of the boycott and the
reasons for its implementation. Therefore, since the boycott, unlike the
cartel, almost always will be detected and is easy to demonstrate, the
need for an additional economic penalty is not as great. Moreover, the
boycott victim has a greater incentive to sue than the cartel victim. The
latter may pass on the higher prices to his customers, but the former has
no such alternative.2
I See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICs 63-77 (1976).
Id. at 81-96.
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 227 (1976).
For a good, general discussion of the mechanics of price-fixing, see F. SCHERER, IN-
DUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 158-64 (1970). For an exhaustive
analysis, see Erickson, The Economics of Price Fixing, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 82
(1969).
1 See Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CH. L. REV. 500, 514
(1971); Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement 13 J. LAW & ECON. 365,
418-19 (1970).
1 Deterence is the theory. However, as Professor Posner has indicated, "the smoothly
functioning cartel is less likely to generate evidence of actual agreement. What the law
mainly penalizes is attempts to fix .prices. The completed conspiracy often escapes atten-
tion." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (1973).
1 See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210 (1959); FTC v.
Fashion Originators' Guild, 312 U.S. 457, 461 (1941).
1 For a discussion of the "passing on" defense in antitrust damage proceedings, see
SULLIVAN, supra note 126, § 252.
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For these reasons we think that the ordinary tort relief of actual
damages plus punitive awards at the court's discretion better fits the
needs of society. This would bring the statute into line with the Virginia
Antitrust Act. We therefore recommend this change."I
I The authors also recommend that the Conspiracy Statute's criminal penalty be
abolished. As previously indicated, see note 23 supra, it is of no significance.
